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Roman law considered clothing as a res, as 
something that could be the object of legal 
relations, specifically as a res corporalis, a res 
quae usu consumatur, a res nec mancipi and a res 
mobilis. These characteristics of vestis as a res 
were of great practical importance and to a large 
extent determined the legal regime applicable to 
the personal property of this type of goods, 
specifically in regard to possession, right of 
usufruct and modes of acquiring ownership, as 
usucapio, occupatio, specificatio and some cases of 
accessio affecting movables goods: textura and 
tinctura.   
 
 





En Derecho romano fue considerada la 
vestimenta como una res, como un objeto 
susceptible de relaciones jurídicas, en concreto, 
como una res corporalis, una res quae usu 
consumatur, una res nec mancipi y una res mobilis. 
Estas características de la vestis como res fueron 
de una gran importancia práctica y en gran 
medida determinaron el régimen jurídico 
aplicable a la propiedad de esta clase de bienes, 
en particular respecto a la posesión, el derecho de 
usufructo y los modos de adquirir la propiedad, 
tales como la usucapio, la occupatio, la specificatio 
y algunos casos de accessio relativos a bienes 
muebles: la textura y la tinctura.     
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 Roman law considered clothing –vestis or vestimentum– as a res, as something that 
could be the object of legal relations. The word res is much used in Roman Law. Its primary 
meaning was a physical object, a thing. Later, it came to have a much wider meaning: it was 
any asset that had economic and juridical value. This broadening of the meaning of res was 
reflected in the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things, which can be found in 
various passages in Gaius’ Institutes (2nd century AD) that were included almost literally in 
the Institutes and also the Digest of the emperor Justinian I. In them the jurist states that 
“corporeal things are tangible, as land, a slave, clothing, gold, silver, and innumerable others. 
Incorporeal things are intangible; such as those which have an existence simply in law as 
inheritance, usufruct or obligation”.1 So clothing, vestis, is a res corporalis, a material entity 
which is the object of legal relations: property, enjoyment, transmission. 
 In addition to being classified as a res corporalis, vestis can also be classified according 
to other dichotomies applied to a res by Roman jurists. Vestis belongs to the group of things 
the normal use of which consists in full or partial consumption (res quae usu consumuntur);2 
to the group of things that are not mancipable (res nec mancipi), as opposed to those that are –
things taken by the hand and so alienable– (res mancipi), a dichotomy of remote origin, but 
extremely important in archaic and classical Roman law;3 and to the group of movable things 
(res mobiles), as opposed to those that are immovable (res immobiles).   
                                                 
1  G. 2, 12-13: 12. Quaedam praeterea res corporales sunt, quaedam incorporales. 13. Corporales hae sunt, 
quae tangi possunt, uelut fundus, homo, uestis, aurum, argentum et denique aliae res innumerabiles; See 
also I. 1, 2, pr.-2; GAI. 2 inst. D. 1, 8, 1, 1; and EG. 2, 1, 2 and 5. See about this dichotomy: PUGLIESE, G., Res 
corporales, res incorporales e il problema del diritto soggettivo, Milano, Giuffrè, 1951; ZAMORANI, P., 
“Gaio e la distinzione tra «res corporales» e «res incorporales»”, in Labeo. Rassegna di Diritto Romano, 
Naples, Jovene, 1974, 20, pp. 362 ff.; BONA, F., “Il coordinamento delle distinzioni «res corporales-res 
incorporales» e «res mancipi-res nec mancipi» nella sistematica gaiana”, in AA.VV., Prospettive 
sistematiche nel diritto romano, Turin, Giappichelli, 1976, pp. 409 ff. (= Lectio sua. Studi editi e inediti di 
diritto romano, 2, Pavia, CEDAM, 2003, p. 1091 ff.); BALDESSARELLI, F., “A proposito della rilevanza 
giuridica della distinzione tra res corporales e res incorporales nel diritto romano clasico”, in Revue 
Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité, Paris, Éditions de Boccard, 1990, 37, pp. 87 ff.; BURDESE, A., 
“Considerazioni sulle res corporales e incorporales quali elementi del patrimonio (in margine al 
pensiero di Gaetano Scherillo)”, in BALESTRI FUMAGALLI, M. et al. (ed.), Gaetano Scherillo (Atti 
Convegno-Milano 1992), Bologna, Cisalpino, 1994, pp. 23 ff. (= Miscellanea romanistica, Madrid, 
Fundación Seminario de Derecho Romano “Ursicino Álvarez”, 1994, pp. 177 ff.); and DAJCZAK, W., “La 
divisione gaiana in res corporales e incorporales nel manoscritto del Digestum Vetus dagli Archivi della 
Biblioteca di Körnik (BK 824)”, in Seminarios Complutenses de Derecho Romano: Revista Complutense de 
Derecho Romano y tradición romanística, Madrid, Fundación Seminario de Derecho Romano “Ursicino 
Álvarez”, 2015, 28 (En memoria de José María Coma Fort), pp. 327 ff. 
2  I. 2, 4, 2: Constituitur autem usus fructus non tantum in fundo et aedibus, verum etiam in servis et iumentis 
ceterisque rebus, exceptis his quae ipso usu consumuntur:  nam eae neque naturali ratione neque civili 
recipiunt usum fructum.  quo numero sunt vinum, oleum, frumentum, vestimenta.  
3  On the dichotomy res mancipi and res nec mancipi see GALLO, F., “Studi sulla distinzione fra «res 
mancipi» e «res nec mancipi». Con una «nota di lettura» di Ferdinando Zucotti”, in Rivista di Diritto 
Romano, Milan, LED, 2004, 4, pp. 1-40.     
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 These characteristics of vestis as a res were not a matter of the Roman jurists’ simply 
wanting to establish a taxonomy, but were of great practical importance and to a large extent 
determined the legal regime applicable to this type of goods: everything to do with the modes 
of acquiring ownership of a vestis and the real rights with which it can be encumbered; 
possessory protection; intestate inheritance and testamentary provisions regarding vestis; 
contracts, obligations and guarantees concerning, or in some way related to, vestis; and 
private offences representing an attack on this kind of goods. In what follows I shall deal with 
clothing as the object of property law and only incidentally with matters to do with clothing in 
the law of obligations and contracts, and in the law of descent and distribution, especially 
legacies, a subject on which there is a strikingly large body of discussion of specific cases. Nor 
shall I deal with the restrictions on ownership of vestes, sumptuary law or other issues of 
public law.   
 The term vestis, or its derivative vestimentum, is the one usually employed in a generic 
sense in Roman legal texts. It is the legal term used to refer to the material entity that is the 
subject of this article. In the Digest, Callistratus (2nd-3rd century AD) gives a hermeneutic 
rule concerning the use of this word in legal contexts: “vestis should be construed as meaning 
both male clothing (vestis virilis) and female clothing (vestis muliebris), and also stage clothing 
(vestis scaenica), including that which is used in tragedy or in playing the zither”.4 It follows 
from this rule that a garment’s aesthetic connotations in regard to the user’s sex, status or 
rank, the use or purpose to be given to it, or any other social, cultural or economic 
connotations are not taken into account by law when the generic term vestis is employed in 
legal rules, declarations, deeds or dealings. So, if, for example, in his will Titus names Caius as 
legatee of his vestes, these should be understood as being all the clothes that belonged to 
Titus; not only the male clothes, but also the female clothes, if, for any reason, he had any of 
the latter among his property, those of everyday use as well as those of formal or recreational 
use, those of linen as well as those of wool or silk, and purpureae vestes as well as those of 
lesser value. 
 For the case in which the term vestis or vestimentum is not employed isolated in legal 
rules, declarations, deeds or dealings, Pomponius (2nd century AD) offers us an interesting 
passage contained in the Digest about vestimenta virilia,5 in which he resolves an 
                                                 
4  CALL. 4 de cognit. D. 50, 16, 127: "Vestis" appellatione tam virilis quam muliebris et scaenica, etiamsi 
tragica aut citharoedica sit, continetur. 
5  POMPON. 4 ad Q. Muc. D. 34, 2, 33: Inter vestem virilem et vestimenta virilia nihil interest: sed difficultatem 
facit mens legantis, si et ipse solitus fuerit uti quadam veste, quae etiam mulieribus conveniens est. itaque 
ante omnia dicendum est eam legatam esse, de qua senserit testator, non quae re vera aut muliebris aut 
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interpretative problem raised with a legacy. He advises that the intention of the testator 
bequeathing a legacy, the mens legantis, must prevail over the typical meanings of the verba 
employed in bequeathing it. Thus, the legacy of vestimenta virilia would include the clothes 
intended by the testator, independently of whether they were conventionally female. Faced 
with the dilemma between voluntas and verba, the jurist opted, then, for the former and cited 
in support of his interpretation the authority of the republican jurist Quintus Mucius Scaevola, 
who proposed with a certain “mischief” the same solution in a hypothesis involving the 
opposite circumstance: that of a senator of his acquaintance who habitually wore female 
dinner dress. So, in the hypothesis that the said senator left in his will a legacy of vestimenta 
muliebria, the female clothes that he put on to dine would not have been included in it. 
However, that should not lead to the conclusion that the jurists advocated relativity and 
subjectivity in the meaning of things and that voluntas must always prevail over verba, but 
that in both cases the situations were exceptional and anomalous, and it was possible to know 
the testator’s intention. Had it not been that type of situation, or even if it had but somehow 
not proved possible to reconstruct the will of the testator, the legacy would have included 
male and female clothes respectively, in accordance with the typical meaning of vestimenta 
virilia and muliebria.6 This passage also suggests, as rightly stated,7 “the idea that even people 
of higher rank could indulge in this kind of behaviour, namely, wearing female clothing, which 
they used as if it were men’s: qua ipse quasi virili utebatur, without incurring any legal 
consequences, at least when this occurred privately”. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
virilis sit. nam et quintus titius ait scire se quendam senatorem muliebribus cenatoriis uti solitum, qui si 
legaret muliebrem vestem, non videretur de ea sensisse, qua ipse quasi virili utebatur. On this passage see 
MASCHI, C. A., Studi sull’interpretazioni dei legati. Verba e voluntas, Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1938, p. 34 f.; 
GANDOLFI, G., Lezioni sull’interpretazione dei negozi giuridici. Corso di esegesi delle fonti del diritto 
romano, Milan, La Goliardica, 1962, pp. 3-6, and Studi sull’interpretazione degli atti negoziali in diritto 
romano, Milan, Giuffrè, 1966, pp. 87-89; ASTOLFI, R., Studi sull’oggetto dei legati in diritto romano, 2, 
Padua, CEDAM, 1969, pp. 251-255, and “Abiti maschili e femminili”, in Labeo, Rassegna di Diritto 
Romano, Naples, Jovene, 1971, 17, pp. 33-39; GUARINO, A. “Sul legato di vesti”, in Labeo, Rassegna di 
Diritto Romano, Naples, Jovene, 1970, 16, pp. 58-60; JOHN, U., Die Auslegung des Legats von 
Sachgesamtheiten im römischen Recht bis Labeo, Karlsruhe, Müller, 1970, pp. 102-104; SOFO, C., 
«Senatores boni viri», in Index. Quaderni camerti di studi romanistici, Naples, Jovene, 1970, 1, pp. 396 f.; 
WATSON, A., The Law of Succession in the Later Roman Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 88; 
WIELING, H. J., Testamentsauslegung im römischen Recht, Munich, C. H. Beck, 1972, pp. 46 f. and 102 f.; 
and DALLA, D., “Ubi Venus mutatur”. Omosessualità e diritto nel mondo romano, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987, pp. 
21-23; and specially K. TUORI, “Dig. (34), 2, 33: The return of the cross-dressing senator”, in Arctos. Acta 
Philologica Fennica, University of Helsinki, 2009, 43, pp. 191-200. 
6  See also my contribution “On the Economic and Social Category of Garments in the Responsa of the 
Roman Jurists”, in ORTIZ, J., ALFARO, C., TURELL, L. and MARTÍNEZ, M. J. (eds.) Purpureae Vestes, V, 
Textiles, Basketry and Dyes in the Ancient Mediterranean World, University of Valencia, 2016, p. 152.   
7  RAGGI, A., “Cross-dressing in Rome between norm and practice”, in CAMPANILE, D., CARLÀ-UHINK, F. and 
FACELLA, M., TransAntiquity, Cross-Dressing and Transgender Dynamics in the Ancient World, London-
New York, Routledge, 2017, p. 65. 
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 Similarly, when a constitution of Valentinian I, Valens and Gratian in 369 included 
vestes among the goods that were to be confiscated from a person sentenced to proscription, 
these had to be understood as all the vestes belonging to the person so sentenced without 
exception; and the term vestis had likewise be understood generically as referring to every 
kind of clothing, without distinction, in the expression item vestis,8 with which the jurist 
Pomponius, in completing a list of goods drawn up by Marcellus (2nd century AD), supposedly 
excluded clothing from the goods that war captives recovered by the right of postliminium, ie, 
when they returned to Roman territory and regained their freedom and all their former 
rights. The reason for this strange exclusion is not given in the Digest and this laconic 
statement, which constitutes the whole of the passage, is probably just a fragment of a much 
longer original passage by Pomponius. 
 Moreover, vestis ended up being included in the legal concept of victus –“nourishment”, 
“victuals”–, hence food, drink, the care of the body, and everything necessary to human life is 
embraced in the term "maintenance" and Labeo (1st century BC-1st century AD) said that 
maintenance also includes clothing.9 In this regard attention should be drawn to the existence 
of differing opinions among Roman jurists concerning bedclothes, blankets and bedspreads. 
This can be seen in two passages in the Digest. Whereas, in the opinion of Labeo, quoted by 
Ulpian,10 bedclothes (stratus, περίστρωμα), understood as comprising all the clothes put on, 
and that can be used to cover, a bed (stragula vestis), should be excluded from the concept of 
vestis as “nourishment” (victus), another jurist, Aulus Ofilius (1st century AD), cited by Gaius, 
had previously included both clothes (vestimenta) and bedclothes (stramenta) in victus, “as 
nobody can live without them”.11 This was no idle matter, as the extent of the maintenance to 
                                                 
8  POMPON. 37 ad Q. Muc. D. 49, 15, 3.  
9  VLP. 58 ed. D. 50, 16, 43: Verbo "victus" continentur, quae esui potuique cultuique corporis quaeque ad 
vivendum homini necessaria sunt. Vestem quoque victus habere vicem Labeo ait. See also VLP. 1 de omn. 
trib. D. 27, 2, 3, 2. On VLP. 58 ed. D. 50, 16, 43 and the meaning of victus and alimenta in the roman 
jurisprudence see WYCISK, F., “«Alimenta» et «victus» dans le droit romain classique”, in Revue historique 
de droit français et étranger, Paris, Sirey, 1972, 50, 2, pp. 205-228; ALBURQUERQUE SACRISTÁN, J. M., 
“Aproximación a la perspectiva jurisprudencial sobre el contenido de la prestación de alimentos 
derivada de una relación de parentesco”, in Anuario da Facultade de Dereito da Universidade da Coruña, 
University of La Coruña, 2005, 9, pp. 21 ff.; and La prestación de alimentos en Derecho romano y su 
proyección en el derecho actual, Madrid, Dykinson, 2010; specially SACCOCCIO, A., “Victus e alimenta 
nelle fonti giuridiche romane: Storia di un’evoluzione dogmatico-concettual”, in Roma e America. Diritto 
romano comune, Modena, Enrico Mucchi, 2012, 33, pp. 139-153; and CENTOLA, D. A., “Alcune 
osservazioni sull'origine del diritto agli alimenti nell'àmbito familiare”, in Teoria e storia del diritto 
privato, University of Salerno, 2013, 6, p. 12.      
10  VLP. 58 ed. D. 50, 16, 45: In "stratu" omne vestimentum contineri quod iniciatur Labeo ait: neque enim 
dubium est, quin stragula vestis sit omne pallium, περίστρωμα. In victu ergo vestem accipiemus non 
stragulam, in stratu omnem stragulam vestem. 
11  GAI. 2 ad leg. XII tab. D. 50, 16, 234, 2: Verbum "vivere" quidam putant ad cibum pertinere: sed Ofilius ad 
Atticum ait his verbis et vestimenta et stramenta contineri, sine his enim vivere neminem posse. 
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be provided by whoever had a duty to do so in virtue of a blood tie, an agreement, a legacy or 
other testamentary provision depended on the scope given to the term victus. This was 
especially important from the end of the second century AD onwards, when the emperors 
Marcus Aurelius and Antoninus Pius made the obligation to provide maintenance between 
parents and children, and between patrons and freedmen, a legal and not just a moral duty, 
and specific measures were laid down to legally enforce fulfilment. Subsequently, a 
constitution of Constantine I and Licinius in 315 established, in order to stop the alarming 
growth of the infanticide, to avoid that poor parents be driven to the parricide, the provision 
of nourishment for infants, expressly including clothing, to be charged to public funds at the 
request of the parents if they were destitute.12 
 Vestis also bears a certain relationship to the legal concept of fruit (fructus). Fruits 
belonged to the owner, but in the case of a right of usufruct, the usufructuary’s most 
important benefit was the right to take and own the fruits of the property subject to the 
usufruct. This means that civil fruits –the revenue the owner, possessor or usufructuary of 
clothes might have obtained from hiring out vestes–13 were considered fruits, something the 
judge had to take into account when a legal claim was made for vestes and he sentenced the 
defendant to payment of the fruits obtained with them.  
 The fact that vestis was a res nec mancipi means that it was one of the goods regarded 
as less valuable, less essential to the household in early Roman society. The most important 
means of production of a peasant economy, such as the Roman, belonged to the class of res 
mancipi. Moreover, the economic and legal status of the vestis did not vary, however luxurious 
the garment in question or even if it was dyed with the most expensive purple. This does not 
mean that the degree of sumptuousness of the garment was always and in every case 
completely irrelevant from the legal viewpoint, as shall be seen later on in regard to the 
mobilia pretiosa. Res mancipi included exclusively buildings and land on Italian soil, rustic 
servitudes attaching to such land, slaves and farm animals of draft and burden, such as oxen, 
horses, mules or asses. The distinction between res mancipi and res nec mancipi was the most 
                                                 
12  CT. 11, 27, 1: (…) Officiumque tuum haec cura perstringat, ut, si quis parens adferat subolem, quam pro 
paupertate educare non possit, nec in alimentis nec in veste impertienda tardetur, cum educatio nascentis 
infantiae moras ferre non possit (…). On this constitution and his matter see BIANCHINI, M. G., 
“Provvidenze costantiniane a favore di genitore indigente: per una lettura di CTh. 11. 27. 1-2”, in Annali 
della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza di Genova, Genoa, De Ferrari, 1984, 20, pp. 30 ff.; and CORBO, C., 
«Paupertas». La legislazione tardoantica (IV-V sec.), Naples, Satura, 2006, pp. 11-22 and 66-79.   
13  GAI. 6 ad leg. XII tab. D. 22, 1, 19 pr.: Videamus, an in rebus petitis in fructus quoque condemnatur 
possessor. Quid enim si argentum aut vestimentum aliam omnibus ve similem rem, quid praeterea si usum 
fructum aut nudam proprietatem, cum alienus usus fructus sit, petierit? (…) Praeterea Gallus Aelius putat, 
si vestimenta aut scyphus petita sint, in fructu haec numeranda esse, quod locata ea re mercedis nomine 
capi potuerit.   
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important in Roman law. It dated from Rome’s earliest period and survived until it was 
abolished definitely by Justinian. It had a fundamental meaning in the conveyance of property. 
As Gaius states, “there is an important difference between things mancipable and things not 
mancipable. Complete ownership in things not mancipable is transferred by merely informal 
delivery of possession (traditio), if they are corporeal and capable of delivery. Thus when 
possession of clothes or gold or silver is delivered on account of a sale or gift or any other 
cause, the property passes at once, if the person who conveys is owner of them”.14 On the 
other hand, mancipable things became alienable by means of the extremely formal procedure 
by bronze and balance, called mancipation (mancipatio), or through a special conveyance by 
surrender before a magistrate (in iure cessio). 
 As already noted, vestes were considered consumable things –res quae usu 
consumuntur–, which entails that a usufruct, ie “the right of using and taking the fruits of 
property not one’s own, without impairing the substance of that property”15, could not be 
established in regard to them. “A usufruct may be created not only in land or buildings, but 
also in slaves, cattle, and other objects generally, except such as are actually consumed by 
being used, of which a genuine usufruct is impossible by both natural and civil law. Among 
them are wine, oil, grain, clothing, and perhaps we may also say coined money; for a sum of 
money is in a sense extinguished by changing hands, as it constantly does in simply being 
used. For convenience sake, however, a decree of the senate under Tiberius stated that a 
usufruct could be created in such things, provided that due security be given to the heir. Thus 
if a usufruct of money be given by legacy, that money, on being delivered to the legatee, 
becomes his property, though he has to give security to the heir that he will repay an 
equivalent sum on his dying or undergoing a loss of status. And all things of this class, when 
delivered to the legatee, become his property, though they are first appraised, and the legatee 
then gives security (cautio) that if he dies or undergoes a loss of status he will pay the value 
which was put upon them. Thus in point of fact the senate did not introduce a usufruct of such 
things, for that was beyond its power, but established a right analogous to usufruct, quasi 
ususfructus, by requiring security”.16 Therefore, what can be created on vestis is a quasi 
                                                 
14  GAI. 2, 18-20: 18. Magna autem differentia est inter mancipi res et nec mancipi. 19. Nam res nec mancipi 
ipsa traditione pleno iure alterius fiunt, si modo corporales sunt et ob id recipiunt traditionem. 20. Itaque si 
tibi uestem uel aurum uel argentum tradidero siue ex uenditionis causa siue ex donationis siue quauis alia 
ex causa, statim tua fit ea res, si modo ego eius dominus sim. 
15  I. 2, 4, pr.: Usus fructus est ius alienis rebus utendi fruendi salva rerum substantia.   
16  I. 2, 4, 2: Constituitur autem usus fructus non tantum in fundo et aedibus, verum etiam in servis et iumentis 
ceterisque rebus, exceptis his quae ipso usu consumuntur:  nam eae neque naturali ratione neque civili 
recipiunt usum fructum. quo numero sunt vinum, oleum, frumentum, vestimenta. quibus proxima est 
pecunia numerata: namque in ipso usu adsidua permutatione quodammodo extinguitur. sed utilitatis causa 
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ususfructus, a term that was coined in Justinian law, an exceptional form of a usufruct of things 
which are consumed in use. In practice this meant that when the usufruct of vestes was 
extinguished, the usufructuary was bound to return not the same vestes that were delivered to 
him, but the same quantity of vestes of the same quality. That decree of the senate also 
provided for the possibility of creating a quasi ususfructus on wool and purple.17  
 However, alongside this ususfructus vestimentorum, which was a usufruct of quantity, 
provision was made for an ordinary usufruct of vestes, in which case the usufructuary was 
bound to use the clothes carefully and in accordance with their specific purpose, as he had to 
return the same vestes as he had received, normally to the heir of the person who created the 
usufruct. This type of usufruct would be employed in the case of vestes of singular value or 
characteristics, such as a funeral suit or a stage costume or a theatre curtain, and the jurists 
allowed the usufructuary to even hire out such vestes to a third party, provided they were to 
be used for their specific purpose; in the case of vestis scaenica, for example, only for use on 
the stage.18 In the opinion of some jurists, such as Pomponius, the usufructuary could be held 
liable for any serious deterioration of the vestis only if he had acted fraudulently, even if he 
had promised to return the vestis to the heir. This solution, with more benign consequences 
for the usufructuary, is the one included in the Digest.19   
 Clothing is obviously a member of the class of res mobiles, things that can be moved 
from one place to another. This important divisio rerum was established as early as the law of 
the Twelve Tables (5th century BC), a distinction being made between fundi, lands, and 
ceterae res, anything else, essentially for the purpose of the usucapio of goods.20 But before 
dealing with the implications of a vestis being a movable thing in regard to various institutions 
                                                                                                                                                                  
senatus censuit, posse etiam earum rerum usum fructum constitui, ut tamen eo nomine heredi utiliter 
caveatur (…) ergo senatus non fecit quidem earum rerum usum fructum (nec enim poterat), sed per 
cautionem quasi usum fructum constituit.  
17  VLP. 18 Sab. D. 7, 5, 11: Si lanae alicui legatus sit usus fructus vel odorum vel aromatum, nullus videtur usus 
fructus in istis iure constitutus, sed ad senatus consultum erit descendendum, quod de cautione eorum 
loquitur. SCAEV. 15 dig. D. 33, 2, 32, 2: Uxori usum fructum domuum et omnium rerum, quae in his domibus 
erant, excepto argento legaverat, item usum fructum fundorum et salinarum: quaesitum est, an lanae 
cuiusque coloris mercis causa paratae, item purpurae, quae in domibus erat, usus fructus ei deberetur. 
Respondit excepto argento et his, quae mercis causa comparata sunt, ceterorum omnium usum fructum 
legatariam habere. 
18  VLP. 18 Sab. D. 7, 1, 15, 4-5: 4. Et si vestimentorum usus fructus legatus sit non sic, ut quantitatis usus 
fructus legetur, dicendum est ita uti eum debere, ne abutatur: nec tamen locaturum, quia vir bonus ita non 
uteretur. 5. Proinde etsi scaenicae vestis usus fructus legetur vel aulaei vel alterius apparatus, alibi quam in 
scaena non utetur, sed an et locare possit, videndum est: et puto locaturum, et licet testator commodare, 
non locare fuerit solitus, tamen ipsum fructuarium locaturum tam scaenicam quam funebrem vestem. 
19  VLP. 51 ed. D. 7, 9, 9, 3: Si vestis usus fructus legatus sit, scripsit Pomponius, quamquam heres stipulatus sit 
finito usu fructu vestem reddi, attamen non obligari promissorem, si eam sine dolo malo adtritam 
reddiderit. 
20  L. XII TAB. 6, 3 (CIC. top. 4, 23): Usus auctoritas fundi biennium est, – ceterarum rerum omnium – annuus 
est usus. 
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of private law, it will be useful to refer to the concept of mobilia pretiosa –precious movable 
goods–. This concept is first found in a passage by Ulpian, through which we learn that the 
praetorian edict listed vestis serica –a silk dress– among the res pretiosiores for the purpose of 
obliging the seller of this class of goods to promise the buyer compensation amounting to 
twice the sale price (stipulatio duplae) in the event of the item belonging to someone other 
than the seller or the loss of such goods through eviction (evictio).21 
 The category of mobilia pretiosa reappears in a constitution of the emperor 
Constantine in 32622 which mentions as such vestes together with other goods such as gold, 
silver and pearls. The constitution prohibits tutors and guardians from selling that class of 
goods belonging to their wards, as it considers this to be potentially prejudicial to the wards’ 
assets. The reason for this prohibition was most likely the fact that abuse by guardians of the 
assets of wards under the age of puberty was common and the oratio of Septimius Severus 
dating from 195 which was in force at that time proved ineffective to curb this. The 
constitution also prohibited the sale of other assets of minors coming under the traditional 
category of res mancipi: urban slaves, houses, baths and granaries. In broadening the scope of 
the ban to encompass the sale of many other assets belonging to wards, it repealed the old 
oratio of Septimius Severus, which only prohibited guardians from selling wards’ landed 
property and rural slaves unless the transaction was authorised in each case by the praetor. 
The concept of mobilia pretiosa, used in law and of which vestes constitute a class, is 
consistent with a socioeconomic model different from the one based on land ownership, 
farming and hereditary transmission of wealth to which the traditional distinction between 
res mancipi and res nec mancipi corresponded and with which Septimius Severus’s oratio was 
still imbued, to judge by the nature of the wards’ goods it sought to keep safe from being 
plundered by guardians. By extending the prohibition to transactions involving mobilia 
pretiosa and other goods, Constantine’s constitution was better suited than Septimius 
Severus’s to an economy based primarily on commercial relations and the exchange value of 
things in the market. Proof of this is that the constitution did not prohibit the free sale by 
                                                 
21  VLP. ed. 32. D. 21, 2, 37, 1: Quod autem diximus duplam promitti oportere, sic erit accipiendum, ut non ex 
omni re id accipiamus, sed de his rebus, quae pretiosiores essent, si margarita forte aut ornamenta pretiosa 
vel vestis serica vel quid aliud non contemptibile veneat. Per edictum autem curulium etiam de servo cavere 
venditor iubetur. 
22  C. 5, 37, 22, pr.: Lex, quae tutores curatoresque necessitate adstrinxit, ut aurum argentum gemmas vestes 
ceteraque mobilia pretiosa, urbana etiam mancipia, domos balnea horrea atque omnia intra civitates 
venderent omniaque ad nummos redigerent praeter praedia et mancipia rustica, multum minorum utilitati 
adversa est.  See also CT. 3, 30, 3. 
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guardians of minors’ vestes detritae,23 “worn-out clothes”. The devaluation of such vestes due 
to deterioration certainly made them lose their status as mobilia pretiosa, which for the 
legislator must have meant that the alienation of such goods ceased to be potentially 
prejudicial to the indemnity of the wards’ assets, and so such acts did not need to be subject to 
any control by the public authorities. 
 A vestimentum scissum –a torn garment– is different from vestes detritae. The former 
was no longer considered by the praetorian edict as a devalued res, but as a res that was 
missing (abest), that no longer existed as such (res amissa), since the value of a vestis is not in 
the material, but in how it is made up (non in substantia sed in arte), which means that 
whoever returned a vestimentum in such a state to its owner would be held liable.24 It follows 
from this that the praetorian edict conforms to Platonic and also Peripatetic metaphysics 
which accords greater importance to the form of things than to their matter or substance: 
forma dat esse rei: “form gives the essence of things”,25 a concept that will again be 
encountered in the Proculian thesis about who should be considered the owner in the case of 
specificatio.  
 The fact that a vestis has the property of being moveable has various consequences, 
especially in regard to two inter-related institutions: possession and usucapio. Possession is 
regarded essentially as physical control of a thing and is protected by possessory interdicts, 
whereas ownership is the ultimate right, the full title to property, and is protected by actions. 
Therefore possession is a form of presumptive ownership and the man in possession is not 
always the owner. This would be the case of a thief, for example. Possessory interdicts are the 
standard remedies in disputes about possession. They are not judicial trials, but provisory 
remedies issued by the praetors at the request of a claimant and addressed to another person 
upon whom a certain attitude is imposed. To acquire, retain or recover possession of a vestis 
the claimant had to request the appropriate interdict for movable things. To recover a vestis 
taken by force the appropriate interdict was utrubi. Through it the praetor ordered the 
restoration of the vestis to the one who had been evicted by force, providing that his 
possession had not been acquired from the other party by force, stealth or permission. The 
party who had possessed the vestis for longer during the year preceding the issuance of the 
                                                 
23  C. 5, 72, 4: Et sine interpositione decreti tutores vel curatores quarumcumque personarum vestes detritas et 
supervacua animalia vendere permittimus. See also CT. 3, 30, 3. 
24  PAVL. 7 ed. D. 50, 16, 14 pr.: Labeo et Sabinus existimant, si vestimentum scissum reddatur vel res corrupta 
reddita sit, veluti Scyphi collisi aut tabula rasa pictura, videri rem "abesse", quoniam earum rerum pretium 
non in substantia, sed in arte sit positum. Item si dominus rem, quae furto sibi aberat, ignorans emerit, recte 
dicitur res abesse, etiamsi postea id ita esse scierit, quia videtur res ei abesse, cui pretium abest. 
25  That conclusion, worded in scholastic terms, is drawn mainly from the eighth book of Metaphysics of 
Aristotle. 
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interdict would succeed in retaining or regaining possession of a vestis providing that his 
possession had not been obtained by force (vi), secretly (clam) or at the owner’s request 
(precario). 
 In addition to the expeditious recourse to a possessory edict, the owner of the vestes, or 
anyone who believed he was the owner, could bring a proper court case to claim ownership 
(reivindicare) in order to recover the vestes, or their economic value, from the person who 
possessed them illicitly. The plaintiff had to prove the acquisition of the vestes under the rules 
of civil law from its previous quiritary owner and, in accordance with the praetorian edict, had 
to inform the magistrate, when requesting the action for the protection of the ownership of 
vestes, of the number and colour of the vestes he was claiming, but was under no obligation to 
say whether they were new or used.26          
 Usucapio is a mode of acquiring ownership through possession for a prescribed period 
of time.27 This possession has to be continuous and uninterrupted for the required period and 
the result of a transaction or cause constituting grounds for lawful acquisition, and the 
possessor must have acted in good faith when he begins to possess the item in question. For 
the mere possessor of a vestis to become its owner through usucapio, he must be a citizen, the 
vestis must not have been stolen and he must possess it for a year under the conditions set 
out, as this had been the prescribed period, since the law of the Twelve Tables, for usucapio of 
moveable things, whereas that for immoveable things was two years. Another mode of 
acquiring ownership different from usucapio was occupatio, occupation: taking possession of 
ownerless things that were susceptible to private ownership. In so far as they were res nec 
mancipi, vestes could be acquired by occupation. There follow some examples showing how 
ownership of a vestis might be acquired by usucaption and occupation. 
 Let us suppose that Titius finds a toga in the street or some other public place. If the 
toga had been abandoned deliberately by its owner, Titius would automatically acquire 
ownership of it through occupation (occupatio), because the first taker of ownerless property 
becomes its owner. If, however, the toga had been a res mancipi, Titius would not have 
acquired ownership by merely taking possession of it, but would have had to acquire it 
through usucaption after having possessed it for a year. Now let us suppose that the toga had 
been lost or someone who was taking it somewhere had accidentally dropped it. Titius cannot 
                                                 
26  PAVL. 6 ed. D. 6, 1, 6: (…) Et si vestimenta nostra esse vel dari oportere nobis petamus, utrum numerum 
eorum dicere debebimus an et colorem? Et magis est ut utrumque: nam illud inhumanum est cogi nos 
dicere, trita sint an nova (…) 
27  MOD. 5 pan. D. 41, 3, 3: Usucapio est adiectio dominii per continuationem possessionis temporis lege 
definiti. 
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acquire ownership of the toga through occupation, as it was lost, not abandoned, nor can he 
usucapt it, for the same reason. He would be a mere possessor. Let us imagine that Titius 
wants to do a good deal and sells the toga, which is not his, to Caius and that Caius buys it in 
good faith, ie without being aware that the seller of the toga is not its owner. Naturally Caius 
thinks he is the owner of the toga as he has received it from Titius having paid the agreed 
price for it. However, Caius is not the owner, but a mere possessor, of the toga, as that was the 
status of the assigning seller. Nevertheless, since Caius is a Roman citizen and has acted in 
good faith civil law provides him with a remedy if he also fulfils some other conditions: he will 
be able to become the owner of the toga if he possesses it continuously and uninterruptedly 
for a year, provided its real owner does not reclaim it in court from him as the possessor 
before that year of possession is up or expires during the corresponding trial. Once this period 
has expired, a claim for the toga by its former owner would fail and Caius would have 
consolidated his ownership of the toga. Caius could have acquired ownership of the toga 
through usucaption without having realised it, believing that the toga was his from the time 
he bought it. 
 Specificatio (mediaeval word)28 and accessio are two other ways of acquiring 
ownership29 of vestes upon which Roman jurists expressly stated their opinion. The 
properties of a vestis as a res that have already been described are also decisive in these two 
cases. Specificatio was a mode of acquiring ownership by the creation of a new thing (nova 
species) out of someone else’s raw materials; for example, if someone has made a garment 
with another person’s wool. Juristically specificatio becomes important if the maker of the 
new thing from another’s material made it without the latter’s authorisation, even in bad faith 
(mala fides).30 The issue as to who is the owner of the new thing –the owner of the material or 
the maker– was discussed at length by the jurists. Gaius recorded the discussion of this point 
among the jurists of the Proculian and Sabinian schools. Here is what he says: “when someone 
makes something for himself out of another’s materials, Nerva and Proculus are of the opinion 
                                                 
28  Roman jurists used descriptions such as cum ex aliena materia species aliqua facta sit ab aliquo (GAI. 2 
cott. D. 41, 1, 7, 7 = GAI. 2, 1, 17-31) or cum quis ex aliena materia speciem aliquam suo nomine fecerit (I. 2, 
1, 25).   
29  Recently it has been defended, by PLISECKA, A., “Accessio and specificatio reconsidered”, in Legal History 
Review, Leiden, Brill, 2006, 74, 1-2, pp. 45-60, that “contrary to the dominant opinion of contemporary 
Roman law studies, accessio and specificatio were not considered in ancient Roman law as independent 
modes of acquisition of ownership”. According to this author, actually “they became regarded as such 
only in the 12th Century. In ancient Roman law, what later came to be called accessio caused only an 
extension of the ownership of the principal thing to include also the accessory without, however, giving 
rise to a new ownership”.  
30  Cfr. KRAFT, C., “Bona fides als Voraussetzung für den Eigentumserwerb dürch specificatio”, in Legal 
History Review, Leiden, Brill, 2006, 74, 3-4, pp. 289-318. 
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that the maker owns that thing because what has just been made previously belonged to no 
one. Sabinus and Cassius, on the other hand, take the view that natural reason requires that 
the owner of the materials should be the owner of what is made from them, since a thing 
cannot exist without that of which it is made. […] There is, however, the intermediate view of 
those who correctly hold that if the thing can be returned to its original components, the 
better view is that propounded by Sabinus and Cassius, but that if it cannot be so 
reconstituted, Nerva and Proculus are sounder.”31 This intermediate view, that the new thing 
belonged to the maker if it was not reducible to its original form, was also the solution 
adopted by Justinian and, like the Proculian view, basically follows the Platonic principle 
forma dat esse rei as opposed to the Sabinians’ Stoic materialism. “For example, a vessel when 
cast, can easily be reduced to its rude materials of brass, silver, or gold; but wine, oil, or wheat, 
cannot be reconverted into grapes, olives, or ears of corn; nor can mead be resolved into wine 
and honey”.32 
 Gaius does not provide any examples of specificatio regarding clothing and there may 
not have been a single solution in such cases. Let us imagine the following case: Titius has 
made a tunic out of Marcus’s wool. According to the intermediate view, supported by Gaius 
and accepted by Justinian, which is based on the criterion of whether or not the form is 
reversible, two hypotheses must be distinguished depending on whether Marcus’s wool had 
been transformed into yarn when Titius used it to make the tunic. If it had been, Marcus 
would be the owner of the tunic, as the tunic can be transformed back into yarn. But if it 
hadn’t been, Titius would be the tunic’s owner, as the tunic could hardly be turned into a 
shapeless mass of unspun wool again. It is to this hypothesis that the jurist Paulus (2nd-3rd 
century AD) refers in arguing that the wool does not survive when a garment is made from it; 
rather, what exists is a woollen object,33 so the dress would belong to the maker. At all events, 
when the maker acquired ownership of the nova species by means of specificatio he had to 
                                                 
31  GAI. 2 cott. D. 41, 1, 7, 7: Cum quis ex aliena materia speciem aliquam suo nomine fecerit, Nerva et Proculus 
putant hunc dominum esse qui fecerit, quia quod factum est, antea nullius fuerat. Sabinus et Cassius magis 
naturalem rationem efficere putant, ut qui materiae dominus fuerit, idem eius quoque, quod ex eadem 
materia factum sit, dominus esset, quia sine materia nulla species effici possit (…) Est tamen etiam media 
sententia recte existimantium, si species ad materiam reverti possit, verius esse, quod et Sabinus et Cassius 
senserunt, si non possit reverti, verius esse, quod Nervae et Proculo placuit (…). See also GAI. 2, 79 and I. 2, 
1, 25. 
32  GAI. 2 cott. D. 41, 1, 7, 7: (…) Ut ecce vas conflatum ad rudem massam auri vel argenti vel aeris reverti 
potest, vinum vero vel oleum vel frumentum ad uvas et olivas et spicas reverti non potest: ac ne mulsum 
quidem ad mel et vinum vel emplastrum aut collyria ad medicamenta reverti possunt (…) 
33  PAVL. 14 Sab. D. 41, 1, 26 pr.: Sed si meis tabulis navem fecisses, tuam navem esse, quia cupressus non 
maneret, sicuti nec lana vestimento facto, sed cupresseum aut laneum corpus fieret. Proculus indicat hoc 
iure nos uti, quod servio et Labeoni placuisset: in quibus propria qualitas exspectaretur, si quid additum erit 
toto cedit, ut statuae pes aut manus, Scypho fundus aut ansa, lecto fulcrum, navi tabula, aedificio 
cementum: tota enim eius sunt, cuius ante fuerant. 
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compensate the owner of the material, as that acquisition was obviously not free and the 
owner of the material could take legal action to claim its value in the event of a so-called 
action ad exhibendum,34 or action due to theft, as happens in the case of accessio.35 
 Accessio is the attachment of immovable or movable things belonging to different 
owners by natural forces or artificially so that they form an organic unity, a whole. The thing 
that is incorporated is the accession, which is added to the principal. But there is accessio only 
when the attached thing is not readily separable without damage to the property. In the case 
of accessio of a movable thing, the general rule was that the owner of the principal became the 
owner of the whole, irrespective of the good faith of the parties or the identity of the person 
who did the attaching. The two issues in this kind of accessio were: deciding which thing was 
the principal thing and which the accessory; and whether compensation was payable to the 
owner of the accession. Roman law recognised many cases of accessio affecting movables, 
including textura and surely also tinctura, which are of interest here.  
 Textura exists in the case of the inseparable weaving of costly thread or purple owned 
by one party into a garment belonging to another. The owner of a piece of cloth acquires 
ownership of whatever has been woven into it. The cloth is the principal thing and the thread 
the accession. The Institutes of Justinian specifically allow for accessio in regard to purple and 
a garment: “if [...] any one has woven purple belonging to another into his own vestment, the 
purple, although the more valuable, attaches to the vestment as an accession, and its former 
owner has an actio of theft and a condictio against the person who stole it from him, whether 
it was he or someone else who made the vestment. For although things which have perished 
cannot be reclaimed by vindicatio, yet this gives ground for a condictio against the thief, and 
against many other possessors”.36 
 As for tinctura –tincture or dyeing–, if someone dyes another person’s fabric by 
applying a product to it, the owner of the original material becomes the owner of the coloured 
material. “Labeo says that if you dye my wool purple, it will still be mine, because there is no 
difference between wool after it has been dyed, and where it has fallen into mud or filth, and 
                                                 
34  PAVL. 26 ed. D. 10, 4, 12, 3: Si quis ex uvis meis mustum fecerit vel ex olivis oleum vel ex lana vestimenta, 
cum sciret haec aliena esse, utriusque nomine ad exhibendum actione tenebitur, quia quod ex re nostra fit 
nostrum esse verius est. 
35  VLP. 24 ed. D. 10, 4, 7, 2: Idem et si armario vel navi tabulam meam vel ansam scypho iunxeris vel 
emblemata phialae, vel purpuram vestimento intexeris, aut bracchium statuae coadunaveris. 
36  I. 2, 1, 26: Si tamen alienam purpuram quis intexuit suo vestimento, licet pretiosior est purpura, accessionis 
vice cedit vestimento: et qui dominus fuit purpurae, adversus eum qui subripuit habet furti actionem et 
condictionem, sive ipse est qui vestimentum fecit, sive alius. nam extinctae res licet vindicari non possint, 
condici tamen a furibus et a quibusdam aliis possessoribus possunt. 
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has lost its former colour for this reason.”37 As can be seen, the principal thing is not 
necessarily the most valuable thing, as in the case of tinctura and textura, the greater value of 
the purple does not confer ownership of the res nova on the owner of the thread or the dye; 
rather, the embellished item remains the property of the owner of the garment or fabric. 
 
                                                 
37  PAVL. 14 Sab. D. 41, 1, 26, 2: Si meam lanam infeceris, purpuram nihilo minus meam esse Labeo ait, quia 
nihil interest inter purpuram et eam lanam, quae in lutum aut caenum cecidisset atque ita pristinum 
colorem perdidisset. 
